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1. Introduction
This paper may be considered as a continuation of "Some
Instruments of Agricultural Policies in a General Equilibrium
Framework". In that paper, national governments were assumed
to introduce tariffs and quota on international trade and possibly
even a stock policy, for two purposes: 1) in order to keep the
balance of trade of certain commodities within desired bounds, or
2) in order to reach a certain desired domestic price level.
Both producers and consumers were assumed to take all prices
as given and the governments to take the world market prices
as given.
Neither of these papers deals with the specific goals
which would determine these desired levels for domestic variables.
A later paper will discuss possible optimum (tariff) strategies,
but to do this in a relevant way, one first needs more information
about the actual goals of the different societies and govern-
ments. Actually, this paper will not reach the subject of
government policies. It should be considered a preparation
for the discussion of imperfect competition between nations.
In other words, the government of a country, especially of a
large one, may try to influence variables other than domestic
variables by means of tariffs, quota, etc. It may, for example,
try to influence world market prices.
But in order to maintain a connection with economic theory,
and in order to understand the basic features of oligopoly, this
paper shall discuss only the interaction between producer and
consumer, without governmental influence.
The usual approach to imperfect competition by economic
theory looks somewhat casuistic. The aim of this paper is to
present a somewhat unified picture of imperfect competition from
which the special well-known cases may be derived. In the course
of this paper we shall find some justifications for the basic
assumptions made in connection with the theory of general economic
equilibrium under perfect competition. When one thinks about
the real world, each of these assumptions cries for relaxation.
Perhaps the general equilibrium approach itself should be re-
laxed in order to describe the process of arriving at equilibrium.
However, this paper will take the "classical" G.E. approach as a
starting point. We shall remain within a static context and list
the main assumption as:
1. numbers of actors, commodities, factor endowments are given,
2. actors take all prices as given,
3. actors react on prices only,
4. two kinds of actors: producers and consumers
5. producers maximize profits,
6. producers have full knowledge of prices and technology,
7. the technology has nonincreasing returns to scale,
8. consumers maximize utility given the budget constraint and
the full knowledge of prices,
9. the consumers own all endowments,
10. every commodity has a market,
11. in equilibrium every commodity has one price in any market.
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§ 2. Imperfect Competition
The relaxation of any assumption from the list above can
be interpreted as the introduction of imperfect competition, but
traditionally imperfect competition means the relaxation of assump-
tion #3. The converse of #3 is "Not (all actors take all prices
as given)", which is equivalent with "some actors take some prices
as not given."
In general, one thinks of the producer as affecting the price.
We shall also make that assumption, but first a description of what
producers do, or better, what producers can do, will be given.
§ 3. Producer's Behaviour
We shall stick to assumptions #4,5. When given profit
maximization and full knowledge of the technology, what other
factors determine the behaviour of the producer? Two factors
come to mind:
1) the knowledge of the producer,
2) the instruments available to him.
We shall assume
adl) that the producer has full knowledge of the demand
schedule of the consumer, of his income, and of all prices. (It
will become clear during the discussion that the producer does
not need to have all that information separately, he needs only
to kno\>l the slope of IIhis 11 demand curve with respect to his price.)
ad2) that every producer can directly influence his own price
and his own production, but takes the production of the other
producers and their prices as given.
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§4. Some Historical Perspective
In order to better understand the position taken in this
paper, it may be helpful to present a very brief historical
account of the theory of imperfect competition. The history of
the theory of imperfect competition starts in 1839, when A. A.
Cournot tried to show that all forms of competitive behaviour
could be derived from monopolistic theory. The case of perfect
competition was, according to him, a limiting case. His work in
this field was left unnoticed for almost fifty years. Cournot
assumed that the price and quantity of the competitors was given
(there was no equation in the "think model" of the producer,
that is, among the constraints of the maximization problem, for
the reaction of competitors on the own action).
Cournot assumed one homogenous product. Launhardt (1885)
and Hotelling (1929) have relaxed this assumption for the case
of two producers.
Edgeworth (1897) rejected the "no reaction" assumption, thus
introjucing a more game theoretic approach into oligopolistic
theor,.
Cyert and March (1963) have strongly criticized the approach
of describing producer behaviour as centralized profit maximization
with perfect knowledge. They conceive of producers as organizations
with many decision makers with many goals, with aspiration levels,
instead of maximizing behaviour, and with uncertainty.
All these criticisms seem justified, but they complicate the
discussion considerably.
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Hicks (1940) writes (p.85), "Personally I doubt if most
of the problems we shall have to exclude for this reason [i.e.
by excluding decreasing marginal costs and by assuming perfect
competition] are capable of much useful analysis by the methods
of economic theory."
The model of perfect competition is such a powerful device
because of its simplicity. The more complex the behaviour of the
different actors becomes, the more doubt is cast on the existence
and stability of equilibrium. On the other hand, increasing the
number of decision makers again could increase the "flexibility"
and thus the stability. Joan Robinson (1974) supports the
assumption of a given stable hierarchy between producers where 1)
there is one price leader in each branch who sets the price as a
mark-up over cost, and 2) where other producers take that price as
given (this is a simplification of the theory by Von Stackelberg (1934)).
It must be clear to the reader by now that the approach to the
producer's behaviour set out in the previous paragraph is very simple
indeed. The argument for this is simply that there is not yet a
formal economic theory which can take the "no reaction" criticism
and the Cyert and March criticisms into account in a model with many
commodities and many actors. For reference, see J.J. Laffont and
G. Laroque, (1976).
In this paper, we shall work under some simplifying assumptions
which are not made in the Laffont/Laroque article.
1) We shall disregard the case where the maximum profit is
negative. That is, we shall assume homogeneity of the production
function which corresponds to zero fixed costs.
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This again implies that the integral of marginal costs is equal to the
total cost. Under the assumptions of non increasing returns this
guarantees that profit maximization implies non-negative profits.
2) Only consumption goods are considered.
3) Only one aggregate consumer is considered: the treatment
of many consumers would not essentially change the approach, it would
only make it more complex.
4) We assume that the income of the consumer is given, that is
we neglect all feedback effects of prices on wages, income, etc. If
these assumptions would only imply given factor prices, it would
not be very serious. More serious problems arise, however, be-
cause of the implication the monopolistic profits are not redistri-
buted to consumers. Only the relaxation of this assumption would
yield a truly general equilibrium approach, but for the simpli-
city of exposition it is not attempted here.
§5. The Case of Full Monopoly: The Formula by Amoroso-Robinson.
We consider a monopolist to be one who knows exactly what
the demand curve for his product is: y = g(p). The monopolist
can influence prices and quantities.
The behavioural model is
max z = p • y - F(y)
S.T. Y = g(p)
>
and p,y = 0
( 5 • 1 )
where y is the quantity, p is the price, F(y) is the cost function.
The demand function is assumed to be monotonous so that we may
write
-1P = g (y)
Substituting this equation into the goal function and then
taking the first order condition, we get the famous quality be-
tween marginal costs and marginal returns:
where
p (1 +n) ClF= ay ;
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(5.2)
= Cllnp «0)
n Cllny
This formula is called the Amoroso-Robinson formula.
Thus a monopolist will produce less at a given price than would
a producer under full competition. Consider a case with constant
elasticity:
( 1+n)py = a y
We can then draw the following graph.
pyt (1 ｾ n = 0
-1 < n < 0
"3. Tl = -1
,4. Tl < -1
If we want to find a positive production and a bounded price
the marginal returns must be positive: that is <-1<n=0
1This inplies E = - < - 1; the demand must be quite elastic.
n
As a side product, we may note that if E < - 1, there may be
equilibrium even under decreasing or constant unit costs
(nondecreasing returns to scale). This is standard
economic theory. In the following, we will, however, assume
nonincreasing returns to scale.
The case of full monopoly is quite unrealistic.
Classical demand theory does not consider independent demand
-8-
schedules for different commodities, but starts from utility
maximization under the budget constraint. In doing so, it allows
for substitution and substitution limits any monopoly.
Before we discuss the demand side, a slight generalization
of 5.1 has to be introduced. As returns equal price multiplied
by the quantity sold, we may write
x = y + Z
demand = supply + stock mutation.
Considering in nonstorable commodity, we may write
max w = p(y-z) - F(y)
S.T. y = g(p) + z
>p,y,z = 0
§6. Oligopoly and a Two-Level Utility Function.
6.1 Two-level utility functions
(5.3)
(5.4)
Sato (1967) has introduced the notion of a two-level
production function. That is, a function which may be written
in a hierarchical way as
in which·Y1 is a scalar, Y2 is a vector valued function of the
structure
Y2,1 = F2,1 (Y31'···'Y3 ), , n 1
Y2 2 = F2 ,2 (y 3 n + 1 ' ... , Y3 n +n ),
, 1 ' 1 2
Y2,m = F (Y3 +1'···'Y3' +)2,m Ｇ ｾ Ｍ Ｑ ｾ Ｍ Ｑ ｾ
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Strotz (1957) has, on the other hand, developed the concept
of the utility tree, also a hierarchical structure. Brown and
Heien (1972) have integrated both approaches and studied a two-
level utility function. We shall use this concept in this paper
in order to differentiate between commodities and goods. In this
we follow Cramer (1973):
"Ne consider consumer demand and distinguish between
homogenous goods on the one hand and composite commodities
on the other. By a good, we mean a specific variety or
brand sold at a single price; its representatives are
indistinguishable in use. If, from the consumers' point
of view the quantities of several goods can sensibly be
added together, such gcods belong to the same commodity."
Although we do not know precisely what "sensibly adding
together" means we interpret this as "contributing to the
same branch of the utility function".
We write the model of consumer behaviour as being:
max u(x)
(6.1)
1 = 1, ... ,m
and
n.
m 1
L I Pi' q .. = M
i=1 j . =1 J. -lJ.1 11
For simplicity of notation we write:
and
max u(x)
S.T. x = F(q)
p.q = M
(6.2)
• We assume u(x) and F(q) to be linear homogenous (in the
short run only, the parameters may be adapted between years).
• We assume that every brand corresponds to one pro-
ducer and that one producer produces only one brand.
• The consumer is assumed to take his income and all
prices as given.
6.2 Heterogenous oligopoly
The first order conditions of 6.2 are then
au
= A p ..oq-.-.- 1J 1'
-lJ i
and
p'y = M
Due to linear homogeneity we may write
uA = M
and 6.3 becomes
(6.3)
p ..
1J i =
au
aq, .
1J i
M
u ( 6 • 4)
Differentiating with respect to the price of an arbitrary good
i,ji and arranging all prices and quantities along one vector
[11,···,n i ,···; 1 , .•. ,n ], we can writem m
u .
=
o
I
o
u
H
o
I
o J
(6.5)
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where u is the bordered Hessian of u [F{q)]
0 u 1 --_ur
u 1 u 11 - u 1
u = I I ',I rI "-
U u
r1 ur rr
applying Cramer's rule we write
(6.6)
where Dh is the determinant of the matrix u with the hth colunm
replaced by the right-hand side vector.
We now recall the Amoroso-Robinson equation (5.2):
p ( 1+n) elF= Cly where 11 = elp xClx P (5.2)
and rewrite it in the present context as
Ph + q ＨｃｬｐｾＩＪ =h Clqh
where
h = 1, •.. ,r , (6.7)
is the inverse of the slope of the demand curve as perceived by
the producer.
It is a fundamental assunption of the present approach
that we assume that (at least in equilibrium) :
aph
ClQh
-12-
It is not so much the assumption that the producer has im-
perfect perception which would complicate matters, as it is the
assumption that the producer expects reactions by his competitors
on his own moves. In equilibrium we may write 9h = Yh Substi-
tuting 6.4 and 6.6 in 6.7, we get a set of r simultaneous non-
linear equations in y. Substituting the results in the right
hand side of 6.4 yields the prices.
The system discussed here mayor may not have a solution
but we skip this problem here because the food scene seems to
correspond to a more restricted case: that of homogenous
oligopoly.
§7. From Heterogenous to Homogenous Oligopoly
Hoving from heterogenous oligopoly to homogenous oligopoly
impli<:s that
x. = fCq .. , ... ,q. )1 lJ. . In.
1 1
more and more approximates
X.
1
n.
1
= . L q ..
Ji=1 1Ji
which implies that the substitution elasticities become larger
and 13rger and that the marginal utility of the good more and
more approaches the marginal utility of the commodity. In terms
of a two-dimensional iso-commodity curve, it means that
approaches to
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It is clear that the tangent to the iso-commodity curve
o
will come closer and closer to a slope of (-)45 as long as both
g1 and q2 are positive, which implies that the prices of two
goods must move toward each other as the two goods become better
substitutes for each other, as long as demand for both goods
is positive.
In order to demonstrate that this will be the case under homo-
genous oligopoly and nonincreasing returns, vIe reconsider the equations
of §5 and 6. (From now on we will omit the sUbscript i of j.)
7.1 The Consumer
Under homogenous oligopoly, the bordered hessian (u)
becomes singular. We may, however, derive what the consumer
will do:
and
max u(x)
S.T. x. =
1
n.
1
Lj=1
q ..
1) (7. 1 )
x .. is the quantity of i demanded from the j.th producer.
Ｑ Ｉ ｾ 1
1
The consumer will demand everything from the cheapest producer.
For simplicity's sake, we take the prices of all other commodities
as given, and write
x. = x. (p .. *)
1 1 1)
where
...
p.. = min (p .. )
1) 1)
j
(7 .2)
(7. 3)
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* *write h = i,j and h = i,j
Can this be an equilibrium situation? To find that this is not
the case, consider the oroducer model 5.4.
7.2 The Producer
First we rewrite 5.4:
> 0
The first order condition now becomes:
=
we can write
dWh = _ (dWh +
dYh dZh
Thus the condition dW =
aYh
dWo can only be realized if ---- < 0dZh
aFh(Yh)
as > 0 (not necessarily increasing);dYh
dW
--- < 0 implies that zh will be minimized, that is zh = o.dZ h
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To formulate it in a more economic sense: the producer
will always prefer to adapt his price and quantity than to have
unsold production. In this model, market equilibrLum is desired
by the producer.
o if one producer is the cheapest, he will get all the demand:
X.
1
nh = Ph· aX i
aph
• if two producers have the same lowest price, we get by
producer equals the
ax.
this implies ｾ = 1,
oqh*
by defining the share in demand asS *= nh· h
As mentioned before, an essential assumption of the oligopoly
ax.,
here is that a * for the
qh
consumer. In this case,
theory discussed
ax.
1
real -a-- for the
qh
which yields, ｮ ｾ
q*h
Sh* :: x.
1
This means that under homogenous oligopoly the flexibility
of the demand curve with which the producer is confronted equals
the flexibility of the market demand schedule multiplied by the
share in that demand:
• the Amoroso --Robinson condition under homogenous oligopoly
may be written as
p •
h
qh
(1 +nh* --)x.
1
ClF
n
= ay
n
If aF= --- ｾ Yh > 0 ｾ zh > 0 .
aYh
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So this situation cannot be consistent with desired pro-
ducer behaviour. This again implies that in equilibrium, every
commodity will have only one price. This is a generalization
of the traditional models of competitive equilibrium. The equality
of supply and demand is now a direct consequence of producer
behaviour. The uniqueness of price is a condition for market equili-
brium instead of an independent assumption.
Now, in equilibrium the Amoroso ..Robinson equation is for
every producer:
Op.
1p. + x --
1 i ax.
1
y ..
｟ ｾ ｌ =
x.
1
of. (y .. )J 1J
ay ..1J
, while q .. =1J
Clp
P + x oX
op.
given p. ,x. and ｾ may be ｣ ｾ ｭ ｰ ｵ ｴ ･ ､ from the demand side; then
1 loX.
1
every y.. may be calculated from the corresponding Amoroso--1J
Robinson equation. If the production function is homogenous of
a degree smaller than one, this implies that all pro-
y ..
ducers will produce something. -!2 approximates 0 as the
x.
1
number of producers increases. In the limit we are in the case
of. y .. )
of perfect competition with given prices, p. = J 1J .
1 oy ..1J
If there is only one producer we are again back to the
case of monopoly. A coalition of producers could make more
profit than the individual producers separately. Consider the
profit of a coalition
max p E y . - I F. (y.)
. 1 1 1
which yields as F.G.C.
dF.
1
= dy.
1
The trust can exploit its monopolistic
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power and thus make more profit. The production will be lower,
due to the negative slope of the demand schedule (0). The
supply schedule of the trust (T) will be to the left of the
aggregate supply schedule of independent producers (I).
p
'---
\ T/ / I
Ｇｾｾ
'/ -oD
y
A well-known problem for trusts is that a small producer
will make more profit outside the trust than within.
§8. Relevance of Oligopoly for Food and Agriculture
The foregoing exposition of "old" theory may seem somewhat
irrelevant for the field of food and agriculture because govern-
ment behaviour was left out, and because production and consump-
tion of agricultural commodities are in the hands of an immense
multitude of actors producing fairly homogenous commodities such
as rice, wheat, etc. Where then, is there such a centralization
of decisions that an oligopolistic treatment may be relevant? Two
fields come immediately to mind.
1) The field of marketing and processing of agricultural
commodities,
2) the field of governmental policy at least concerning
imports and exports.
The next paper will therefore treat some optimal agricultural
policies in an oligopolistic (-oligopsonistic) context, thus
attempting to endogenize government policies.
-18-
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APPENDIX
Two-Level utility Function
and
the Activity Approach to Consumption Theory
Many people have criticized the utility function for being
a tautological construct, devoid of any psychological content.
This criticism has induced research on the structure of the
utility function. An explicitly structured utility
function could also help in solving some decomposition problems,
so that an optimal solution could be reached in a decentralized way.
A utility function could also help for interpersonal
comparison of welfare. Direct interpersonal utility comparison
is believed to be inappropriate, however, and a commodity-by-
commodity comparison of personal consumption would not lead to
a consistent ordering. It seemed that some intermediate cardinal
concept could be fruitful. In that context, Lancaster developed
his linear activity analysis of consumption.
Basically, the classical problem is reformulated as
mcx u(z}
S.T z = Bx
<
and px = M
B is the matrix of consumption technology, and every commodity
contributes to one or more characteristics. It can be held that
the characteristics may be defined in an interpersonal way.
Interpersonally inefficient consumption activities may be
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defined as the boundary of the ｾ ｣ ｨ ｡ ｲ ｡ ｣ ｴ ･ ｲ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｣ possibility
curve" when one thinks in terms of oligopoly, the linearity
does not seem appropriate for obvious reasons.
A more detailed formulation would then be:
max u (z)
S.T. z = G(x)
and px < M
This formulation would also be more general than the one
presented in the paper because one good would contribute to many
characteristics: the tree would be a network. The oligopo1istic
producer could spend money on advertising in order to change the
structure of G(x) in an optimal fashion, that is in a way in which
,the price elasticity of the demand of the good would become
very small.
He could also study z = G(x) for given parameter values.
in oreer to find out with which producers he has the highest rate
of ｳ ｵ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｵ ｴ ｡ ｢ ｩ Ｑ ｩ ｴ ｹ and with which he should merge.
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